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Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and
the Takings Clause
John A. Humbach*

"[Clhanged circumstances or new knowledge may make what
was previously permissible no longer so."' For hundreds of
years, as new needs have emerged, the thresholds of nuisance
have evolved. The law of nuisance has been able to evolve, not
just through private initiatives of litigants in court, but also
through the democracy-driven processes of elected state legislatures. In order to protect a land developer's investment, however, the Supreme Court decided to trim back this centuries-old
legislative authority in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.*
The Supreme Court decided Lwas under the "Takings Clause"
of the United States Constitution.3 Specifically, it held that the
Takings Clause denies state legislatures the power to augment the
common law of nuisance if barring undesirable uses of land
would strip the land of "all economically beneficial use."4 In
other words, if a piece of land has no current market value except
in uses that the legislature has found too harmful to allow, the
state must now buy the land if it wants to prevent the harmful
uses.
The Court acknowledged only one exception to this "categorical rule"5 of compensation for such "total takings."6 The excep* Professor of Law, Pace University. J.D. 1966 Ohio State University College of Law;
B.A. 1963 hliami University.
1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992).
2. Id. The factual background of the case is set forth infra text accompanying notes 1722.
3. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.amend. V.
4. Lucar. 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
5. Id. at 2899. The Court described this "categorical treatment" of total-value regulatory takings as one of "at least two discrete categories of regulatory action [recognized] as
compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of
the restraint," The other category consists of regulations that force an "owner to suffer a
physical 'invasion' of his property." Id, at 2893.
6. I.e., takings in which a regulation deprives an owner of "all economically beneficial or
productive use of land." See id. at 2893, 2901.
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tion applies to use restrictions that merely mimic common law
limits on land use that already "inhere in the title itself."' The
Court reasoned that such inherent limits on landowner autonomy, imposed under "background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance,"S are "proscribed use interests [that]
were not a part of. . . title to begin with."g Therefore, state legislatures can still forbid such deleterious uses, even to the point of
total takings, but only if they "do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts."1° The constitutional scope of the legislative power has become, at least for total
takings of land,ll a matter of state common law.
7. Id. at 2900.
8. Id
9. Id at 2899.
10. Id. at 2900.
11. The Lucas opinion suggests in dicta that the Takings Clause does not necessarily
protect personal property to the same degree that it protects real property. The Court
explained that "in the case of personal property, by reason of the State's traditionally high
degree of control over commercial dealings, [the owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically worthless." Id at
2899.
The Court in Lucas had, of course, little choice but to distinguish personal property from
real property: if it applied the Lucas rule to both, it would virtually overrule the whole body
of constitutional law upholding statutory forfeiture as a means to prevent "undesirable"
uses of chattels. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467 (1926) (upholding forfeiture of
automobile used in unlawful transportation of liquor). See also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 688, 690 (1974) (upholding forfeiture of an innocent
owner's yacht used in drug transport); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505
(1921) (upholding forfeiture of innocent owner's automobile used in aid of tax evasion).
The Supreme Court admits "the difficulty of reconciling the broad scope of traditional
forfeiture doctrine with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment." United States v. U.S.
Coin & Currency. 401 U.S. 715, 721 (1971). In fact. "legitimate governmental interests"
or "legitimate purposes" can justify total takings of private property, with no requirement
whatever that the undesirable uses being attacked be nuisances, noxious, or malum in se.
CaZero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688, 690 (1974). See also United States v. $8,850,461 U.S. 555,
562 n.12 (1983) ("important governmental purposes").
The Supreme Court justifies the constitutionality of statutory forfeiture on the basis,
simply, that "state lawmakers, in the exercise of the police power, [are] free to determine
that certain uses of property [are] undesirable" and then adopt confiscation as a "secondary defense against a forbidden use." Caho-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 686 (quoting Van Oster,
272 U.S. at 467). Accord, Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 513 ("It is the illegal use that is the
material consideration, . the guilt or innocence of its owner being accidental."). Statutory forfeiture is a clear modem example of the public interest justifying total takings of
innocent owners' property irrespective of fault, breach of duty, wrongdoing, or illegality
on the owners' part.
Before Lucas the Supreme Court had not suggested that the Takings Clause afforded any
less protection to personal property than to real property. Thus, the Luras dictum to that
effect, if it endures, is another significant innovation for takings law. With this new distinction, the Supreme Court has made it easier for litigants to challenge environmental,

..
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The Supreme Court's new common law test of legislative validity is a major analytical innovation. Historically, it was "the great
office of statutes . . . to remedy defects in the common law,"
adapting the common law "to the changes of time and circumstances."12 After Lucas, however, remedial statutes to improve
the common law will now be subject to preemption by the common law. Such preemption is effectively mandated whenever the
case is one of total taking and the reviewingjudge disagrees with
the legislature's balancing of the values and interests that bear on
determinations of nuisance. Ironically, future legislative efforts to
remedy deficiencies in the common law of nuisance can now be
overturned precisely because the common law fails to protect people from the particular harm in question.
In decreeing this extraordinary reversal of centuries-old roles,
the Supreme Court has reassigned a significant piece of the nation's ultimate land-use law authority from elected state legislatures to the judiciary. The courts, under the pretext of
"regulatory takings" review,l3 will now have the final say on substantive questions of right and wrong when it comes to the uses of
land. Given the potential liabilities involved,l4 one possible effect
of Lucas may be to stunt, if not arrest, the evolution of statutory
protections from nuisance-like and other detrimental uses of
land. As the author of Lucas declared in a dissent to another opinion handed down on the same day as Lucas, the "more natural
direction" of the Supreme Court's temptation is "towards systematically eliminating checks upon its own power; and it succumbs. . . . The Imperial Judiciary lives."l5
growth management, and historic preservation laws without casting the least shadow of
"takings" doubt on chattel forfeiture as a law-and-order weapon in the war against crime.
12. hlunn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113. 134 (1876).
13. A so-called "regulatory taking" may occur when a law or regulation effectively takes
away property rights by, for example, restricting the uses that owners may make of their
land. Since 1922, all laws and regulations have been subject to regulatory takings review
in the courts. See infra text accompanying notes 96-128. The criteria used in this judicial
supervision of the legislative function have been notoriously vague, making the reviews
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
14. If a statute is adopted in good faith and a court later decides that the statute goes
further than the common law of nuisance and effects a total taking as well, "no subsequent
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period
during which the taking was effective." Id at 2901 n.17 (quoting First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)).
15. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874, 2882
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Although the Lucas majority opinion revealed no similar sharp
concern about judicial trenching on the legislative branch, the
most important question decided in Lucas was the institutional
one: which governmental forum should ultimately determine
whether, weighing the public interest against competing private
interests, the negative effects of a given land use are too socially
intolerable to allow? This institutional question is arguably the
only truly general question of the entire "regulatory takings" debate, the myriad specific disputes over particular kinds of regulations and properties being, in the end, merely "ad hoc, factual
inquiries."16
This article reviews the historical tradition in which the common law core of nuisance has been the frequent subject of statutory additions and refinements, providing most of our modern
law of land use and environmental protection. Until Lucas, the
Takings Clause had not been treated as a charter establishing the
courts as boards of revision to rethink and selectively veto legislative determinations in the land use field. Within the scope of "total takings," however, Lucas has converted the Takings Clause
from its original meaning and made it exactly that.

The Lucas case arose when the owner of beachfront property
challenged the constitutionality of the South Carolina Beachfront
Management Act ("the Act").'' The South Carolina Legislature
adopted the Act to prevent a number of negative impacts safety, economic, and environmental - that may result from
building on beaches and dunes.18 The specific provision in con16. Lulas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438

U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
17. S.C. CODEANN.$9 48-39-10 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
18. The Legislature's key findings in support of the Act are set forth in Lucac, 112 S. Ct.
at 2896 n.lO. Building houses on eroding beaches is not just personal folly; such houses
can have harmful impacts on other people as well. Structures at the ocean's edge interrupt
the natural protection that migrating dunes otherwise provide to communities farther inland. The houses themselves can disintegrate in major storms, their debris becoming
windborne missiles that endanger the lives and property of others. In addition, every major coastal humcane seems to bring still another call on the taxpayers to furnish disaster
relief to owners wiped out at the shore. See generally Natasha Zalkin, Comment, Shifting
Sands and Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme Court's Changing Takings Doctrine and South Carolina's
Coastal Zone Statute, 79 CAL.L. REV.205, 211-16 (1991); Frank E. Maloney & Anthony J.
O'Donnell, Jr., Drawing the Line at the Oceanfront: The Role of Coastal Constnution Setback Lines
in Regulating Development of the Coastal Zone, 30 FLA.L. REV.383, 389-91 (1978).
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troversy prohibited owners from constructing new houses seaward of a defined setback line. Approximately two years before
this building prohibition was adopted, Mr. Lucas had paid nearly
one million dollars for two beachfiont lots, both of which were
entirely within the new "no-build" zone.
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Mr. Lucas's takings claim, pointing out that the Legislature's objectives (the
soundness of which were not contested) fell well within longstanding legislative authority to forbid conduct that may cause serious public harm.lg Mr. Lucas took his case to the United States
Supreme Court, arguing that the Takings Clause requires compensation to be paid when a land-use regulation "totally eliminates the value of private pr~perty."~OThe Court agreed
except when "background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance"21 would provide a basis for banning the land
use anyway. The Court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the South Carolina building ban came within such "background principles."22

-

All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of
principles of policy which are other than those on which the
particular right is founded . . . . The limits set to property by
other public interests present themselves as a branch of what is
called the police power of the State.23
19. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), rev'd and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
20. Brief for Petitioner on the Merits at i, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112
S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453).
21. Luras, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
22. Id at 2901-02. On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that Mr. Lucas
had "suffered a temporary taking deserving of compensation." Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, No. 91-453, at 5 (S.C. Nov. 20, 1992) (order on remand). On the issue of
"background principles" the court simply concluded, without elaboration, that the
"Coastal Council has not persuaded us that any common law basis exists by which it could
restrain Lucas's desired use of his land; nor has our research uncovered any such common
law principle." Id at 4. It further remanded the case to the trial court where, it held, the
"sole issue. is a determination of the actual damages Lucas has sustained as the result of
his being temporarily deprived of the use of his property." Id
23. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes, J.).

..
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Restricting the uses of private property under the police power
is one of the primary ways that the government carries out its essential purpose of preserving the general welfare.24 The government has "unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner
from using his property to injure others without having to compensate the value of the forbidden use."25
Every time a legislative body exercises the police power to add
or remove a restriction on property use, it redefines property
rights.26 When new restrictions narrow the scope of private landuse autonomy, incidental impacts on private wealth are likely to
result. The people whose wealth is affected naturally tend to ask
why. On what grounds does the government tell people they cannot fill in their own wetlands, kill snails on their own land, or
move the mirrors in their own theaters?27 What objectives, in
other words, qualify as legitimate police power objectives authorizing the legislature to redefine private property rights?28

24. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491 (1987).
25. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 51 1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also infra note 43 (quoting
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Keystone majority).
Even John Locke, for whom the "great and chief end" of government was "the preservation o f . . . property," agreed that "[p]olitical power . . . [is] a right of making laws [with
penalties] for the regulating and preserving of property . . . ." 2 JOHN LOCKE,
TWO
TREAn s ~ OF
s GOVERNMENT
$8 3, 124 (Everyman's Library 1991) (1690) (emphasis added).
Locke observed that "it would be a direct contradiction for any one to enter into society
with others for the securing and regulating of property, and yet to suppose his land . . .
should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government to which he himself, and the
property of the land, is a subject." 2 Id. 8 120 (emphasis added).
26. See supra text accompanying note 23.
27. See Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. United States, 21 C1. Ct. 153 (1990) (wetlands); Catherine Yang with Peter Hong. The Grass is Looking Greenerfor Landowners, Bus. WK.,July 13,
1992, at 31 (endangered Kanab amber snails); United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City
of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991) (theater mirrors).
28. A major factor in the current "property rights" debate is many people's honest belief that there is no real social harm in doing such things as destroying wetlands, exterminating entire species, or wrecking our nation's cultural legacy. Not so long ago, after all,
wetlands were just swamps, wildlife was mainly an annoyance, and old buildings were
merely in the way. People who form expectations and make investments based on views
that are becoming outmoded can, when brought up short by new social values, feel greatly
disappointed. he problem is one of transition, though being merely transitional does not
make the problem less real.
For a good Legal Realist analysis of how judges behave in deciding takings cases implicating social values that are in transition, seeJohn R. Nolon, Footprints in the Shifiing Sandc of
the Isle of P a l m A Practical Analysis of Regulatory Takings Cases, 8J. LAND USE & EN^. L. 1,
16-19 passim (1992).
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A. Proper L.e@lutive Objectivesfor Redefining Property Rights:
Nuisance vs. Other Undesirable Conduct

The common law of nuisance has long been relevant to takings
analysis because, by definition, property ownership does not include the right to create unlawful nuisances. The Supreme Court
applied this principle in Lucas when it acknowledged that its "categorical rule" for "total takings" does not apply to restrictions
merely mimicking those that already "inhere in the title itself."*g
The principle's application is, however, broader. Because "background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance"30
shape the contours of constitutional "title," the question whether
a statutorily restricted use could be banned as a common law nuisance is a "logically antecedent inquiry"31 for every regulatory
takings case. In essence, the law of nuisance provides a common
law immunity from takings challenges.
Far more importantly, the common law of nuisance has long
given "a fairly helpful clew" on the validity of statutory land-use
restrictions that augment existing common law.S2 The common
law of nuisance has historically been consulted, however, "not for
the purpose of controlling" the question of validity, but only "for
the helpful aid of its a n a l ~ g i e s . " Indeed,
~~
if legislative restrictions on land use were only valid if based on some specific common law nuisance precedent, the legislated evolution of nuisance
thresholds could not occur at all. Such a requirement would disrupt the vital legislative function of modiEying and supplementing
the common law when the latter proves inadequate to meet
changing needs.34
Nevertheless, the very breadth of the "multifaceted health, wel.

29. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992). See supra
text accompanying notes 5-1 1.
30. Id. at 2900.
31. Id at 2899.
32. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
33. Id
34. The very existence of extensive legislated land use restrictions is strong evidence of
the common law's inadequacy to meet changing needs. In their thorough national review
of zoning developments since Euclid, Beuscher and Momson found little basis for concluding that nuisance law is adequate to protect property owners in unzoned areas, noting that,
"[oln the whole one who moves to the open unzoned country is certainly taking his
chances." Jacob H. Beuscher &Jerry W. Momson, Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance
Cases, 1955 WIS. L. REV.440, 447,457. See inza note 131 for related discussion.
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fare and safety" aspects of the police power35 suggests to some
that legislatures' power to reduce property values cannot be "coterminous with the police power itself."36 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example, has seemed inclined to confine noncompensatory use restrictions to a "nuisance exception" resting
on "discrete and narrow purposes"37 and only allowing government to prevent "misuse or illegal use" of property.38
In Lucas, however, the Supreme Court rejected any such narrow
version of the legislative power to regulate uses of landsg (except
for cases of "total takings"). It explained that references in earlier cases to "some objective conception of 'noxiousness' " were
simply the progenitor of our more contemporary statements
that 'land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially
advance[s] legitimate state interests' . . . .' " 4 0 The Court noted
that its cases "have made clear . . . that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfjl these requirement^."^^
L6

35. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.S. 470, 513 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The police power is "one of the most essential of powers, at times
the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government."
District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 149 (1909). "Public safety, public health,
morality, peace and quiet, law and order these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application." Bennan v. Parker, 349 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
36. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). See also Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 906 (S.C. 1991) (Hanvell, J., d'wenting) (contending that regulation of land-use activities may require compensation unless
the prohibited activities are "similar to public nuisances"); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 21 C1. Ct. 161, 167 (1990) (requiring compensation for diminished land
value caused by a ban on rock mining because rock mining "is not considered a nuisance
in this area"); William G. Laffer 111, The Private Property Rights Act: Forcing Federal Reguhtions
to Obey the Bill ofRights, 173 HERITAGE
FOUND.
REP. ISSUEBULL.1 , 3 (Apr. 3, 1992) (stating
that landowners have the right to engage in particular land-use activities unless the activities are defined as "trespass or nuisance" under the common law).
37. Kqstone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
38. Id at 512. The ChiefJustice drew the "misuse or illegal use" test from an arguendo
discussion in Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78,86 (191 1) (holding that the Secretary of Interior did not have the power to limit uses of private inholdings in Yosemite Park). Besides
being dictum, the curtin "misuse or illegal use" test is alsocircular. All uses banned by
legislation are by definition illegal and thus are misuses of property provided the legislation is valid, which is of course precisely the point at issue. T o accept the Curtin dictum
on its face would confirm the constitutional justifiability of any land-use restriction whose
violation the legislature has declared to be an illegal use and, hence, a misuse of land.
39. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in the opinion, perhaps a sign of tempering of his
previously stated views, referred to in the preceding two footnotes and accompanying text.
40. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992) (quoting
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)).
41. Id. (quoting Nolhn, 483 U.S. at 834-35).

-

-
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Indeed, no such narrow reading of state legislatures' land-use
powers, limiting them to re-enacting the common law of nuisance, is supported by precedent. While some land-use regulations upheld against takings challenge may have rested on
discrete and narrow purposes, the same can scarcely be said of
the whole wide array of safety, health, aesthetic, and even lifestyle
objectives that have been validly advanced under the police
power.42 The Court has plainly acknowledged that legislatures
have greater power by using language such as "akin to a public
nuisance" and "nuisance-like" to describe kinds of land uses a
legislature may restrict,43 and by declaring it unnecessary to
"weigh with nicety" the question of whether a particular restricted use was a nuisance according to the common law.44 Even
more to the point, the Court has consistently upheld legislatures'
power to restrict a wide variety of undesirable uses and activities
not considered nuisances at common law, such as siting adult theaters in certain locations,45 trading in eagle feathers,46 building
houses on lots smaller than one to five acresY4'permitting three
or more unrelated tenants to share a single-family houseY48mining gravel,49 leaving timber scraps on the ground,50 constructing
tall buildings,51 selling water interstate,52 and manufacturing and
selling margarine53 and alcoholic beverages.54
In sum, the historic breadth of the legislative power to restrict
uses of property without compensation seems to have extended,
potentially, to any use the legislature deemed likely to harm other
persons or the community as a whole. The Supreme Court in Lu42. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (aesthetics);
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (family lifestyle); other cases cited infia notes 4554.
43. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488, 491 n.20
(1987). As Justice Stevens wrote: "[Nlo individual has a right to use his property so as to
create a nuisance or ofhenuke harm others." Id. (emphasis added).
44. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272,280 (1928) (upholding uncompensated destruction
of cedar trees to protect nearby apple trees owned by others).
45. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres. Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
46. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
47. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
48. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
49. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
50. Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U.S. 510 (1919).
51. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
52. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
53. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
54. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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cm confirmed this broad reach of legislative authority, except for
lands whose sole market value is for uses too harmful to allow.

B. Common Law Nuisances
Impetus for linking legislative land-use powers more closely to
common law nuisance seems to stem from at least two considerations. One is the search for limiting principles to narrow the
range of permissible non-compensable regulations so that not
every law to advance public welfare will be ipso facto insulated
from the Constitution's compensation requiremen~~5
The other
is to avoid placing uncompensated burdens on people who have
committed no wrong and only want to use their own property in
ways that are not noxious or dangerous, or otherwise a "misuse"
of land.56
The notion that nuisance law can provide a suitable exogenous
anchor for takings law is unrealistic. Far from being a likely
source of definition or scope, the common law of nuisance is itself
an "impenetrable jungle."57 The problem is not that common
law nuisance presents many difficult borderline cases, an illusory
objection that Professor Epstein properly refutes.5* The problem
inheres in the very nature of common law nuisance as a body of,
law. It is not a set of flat prohibitions against various deleterious
activities or blameworthy conduct. It is, instead, a multi-factored
balancing process for deciding which harms to prohibit.
Nuisance law starts from an implicit assumption that uses of
land may have detrimental effects on others but still not necessarily be either socially intolerable or in any sense blame~orthy.~g
A
legal rule that tried to prohibit all detrimental effects of land use
would be not only highly impractical but, probably, an economic
disaster. Therefore, when people suffer harm caused by others'
55. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 513 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
56. Id at 512. See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 145
(1978) (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting).
ET AL.,PROSSER
AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS
$86, at 616
57. W. PAGEKEETON
(5th ed. 1984).
58. RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS:
PRIVATE
PROPERTY
AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 115-21 (1985).
59. As the Restatement explains, "Practically all human activities unless camed on in a
wilderness interfere to some extent with others or involve some risk of interference." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS
$4 822 cmt. g (1979). In the Restatement's terminology. only
those uses of land with deleterious effects that are both "significant" and "unreasonable"
can be considered unla~vfulas nuisances. Id 38 821B. 821F, 822(a). 826.
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land uses, there is often no sensible policy choice but to decide
that, on balance, the public interest is best advanced by allowing
the uses (such as important industries) to proceed despite their
harmful effects on neighbors or the community at large.
Legal rights to use property in ways that incidentally harm innocent others are, as a result, well known in our law - they are
the essence of the principle of aizmnum absque inz.~ria.~OEven substantial harms can be lawhlly visited on others (for example,
flooding neighbors by diverting surface water) or on the community (demolishing an inspirational landmark or permitting smokestack emissions that cause acid rain), depending on the policy
judgments and choices reflected in the applicable law.61 Tolerating such rights to cause harm is, as a practical matter, unavoidable, but it does not follow that such rights should ever be
constitutionally inviolable. They must, instead, be variable, evolving with changing times and circumstance.
The common law of public nuisance and of private nuisance
together provide frameworks for varying the outer contours of
property rights to use land. When particular land uses produce
negative impacts on neighboring uses or conflict with other private or societal goals, judges use these frameworks to help them
determine whether or not the negative impacts or conflicts are
too harmful, on balance, to tolerate.
For example, the common law ofprivate nuisance is not a defined catalog of noxious, reprehensible, or even merely forbidden
behavior but is, instead, an essentially relativistic concept.62 A
nuisance, the Supreme Court has said, "may be merely a right
thing in the wrong place - like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard."63 The decision whether particular conduct qualifies as
a private nuisance depends not only on its location and surroundings, but also on whether "the gravity of the harm caused out60. Loss, hurt, or harm without a legally recognized injury.
61. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698 (Me. 1978) (surface water); Hatch v. W.S.
Hatch Co., 283 P.2d 217 (Utah 1955) (noise, fumes, bright lights); Bove v. Donner-Hanna
Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932) (heavily polluting coke plant across
from residence).
62. Seegenerally KEETONet al., supra note 57, at 619-33. The Restatement of Torts espresses
this relativistic character by stating that interference with others' land use can be a nuisance if, among other things, "the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's
conduct." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
5 826(a) (1979).
63. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
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weighs the utility of the c0nduct,"6~or on an even more complex
weighing of various factors that are normal concomitants of private nuisance tests.65
The common law ofpublic nuisance is, if anything, even more
indeterminate than private nuisance in the range of behavior to
which it can potentially apply. Over 700 years ago, Bracton observed that "nuisances are truly infinite."66 In the eighteenth
century, public nuisance was defined as "a species of offenses
against the public order and oeconomical regimen of the state;
being either the doing of a thing to the annoyance of the king's
subjects, or the neglecting to do a thing that the common good
requires."67
As the range of public nuisance developed, it grew to be essentially co-extensive with the police power itself - potentially encompassing any act or omission that "injuriously affects the
safety, health or morals of the public,"68 or acts that "endanger or
injure the property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable
number of persons."69 According to the Second Restatement of
Torts, a public nuisance can be any act that significantly interferes
with public health, safety, peace, comfort, or c o n ~ e n i e n c e .If~ ~
64. KEETONet a].. supra note 57, at 630.
65. See generally Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, bent, and
Future, 54 ALB.L. REV.189, 212-14, 234-36 (1990).
66. HENRY
DE BRACTON,
3 ON THE L\VS
AND CUSTOMS
OF ENGLAND
189 (Samuel E.
Thome trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1569) ("noncmenta vero inanita sunt").
67. 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
* 167. Accord 1 WILLIAM
HAWKINS,
A TREAnsE OF THE PLEASOF THE CROWN
197-200 (Amo Press 1972) (1724). According to Hawkins, the 1724 list of indictable public nuisances included such noisome uses as "common
Bawdy-houses." gaming houses, and stages for rope-dancers, as well as interfering with
public rights of way by laying logs in a navigable public river. Id at 198. It also included
various right-thing-in-the-wrong-place nuisances such as a swineyard in town, "divid[ing]
a House in a Town for poor People to inhabit in, by reason whereof it will be more dangerous in the Time of Infection of the Plague," a brew-house "erected in such an inconvenient Place, wherein the Business cannot be carried on without greatly incommoding the
Neighbourhood," or a common play-house "if it draw together such Numbers of Coaches
or People, etc. as prove generally inconvenient to the Places adjacent." Id. at 198-99.
68. Commonwealth v. South Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry., 205 S.W. 581, 583 (Ky.
1918).
69. See, e.g., Copart Indus. v. Consolidated Edison, 362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y. 1977).
OF TORTS
8 821B(2)(a) (1979). Like private nuisance analy70. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
sis, the law of public nuisance is relativistic, as memorably expressed in the early case that
refused to treat air pollution from candle making as a nuisance because "[lie utility del
chose excusera le noisomeness del stink," id. 9 826 cmt. a (quoting an unnamed case
quoted in JAMES F. STEPHEN.
A GENERAL
VIEWOF THE CRIMINAL
LAWOF ENGLAND
106
(Fred. B. Rothman & Co. 1985) (1890)). But rf. infra text accompanying notes 78-82 (noting that a balancing of utilities may not be appropriate in the public nuisance context).
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the Court's goal in Lucas was to confine the range of permissible
total takings to something less than the full breadth of the police
power, the common law of public nuisance hardly seems to provide the narrowing principles it sought.
The only objective feature that common law nuisance cases
seem to share is that somebody did something, not otherwise a
tort or crime, whose consequences had negative effects on
others.71 Nuisance, "as a general term, describes the consequences
of conduct, the inconveniences to others, rather than the type of
conduct involved."72 Common law nuisance has never confined
courts to a reiteration of past cases declaring certain past uses to
be nuisances. Before the common law of nuisance can supply takings analysis with objective parameters to limit the breadth of legislative powers, nuisance law itself must first be reoriented and,
probably, petrified.
Perhaps because the path of common law nuisance can lead to
such a wide range of prohibitable land uses, the Supreme Court
took pains to caution state courts not to feel overly free in letting
their local common law evolve. It stressed that a decree that eliminates all economically beneficial uses may be "defended" only on
the basis of an "objectively reasonable application of relevant precedent"73 and cited several factors from the Second Restatement of
Torts version of nuisance law as "things" that total takings analysis
will "ordinarily entai1."74
Apparently concerned that the Restatement factors may not sufficiently constrain future common-law developments, the Court
suggested two further "facts" that "ordinarily import[] a lack of
71. CJ KEETONet al., supra note 57, at 619 ("The essence of a private nuisance is an
interjerence." (emphasis added)).
72. Copart Zndus., 362 N.E.2d at 971 (emphasis added). After reviewing numerous examples Dean Prosser concluded that "nuisance, in short, is not conduct, nor is it even a
condition. It is the invasion of an interest, a type of harm or damage
William L.
Prosser, Pn'vate Actions for Public Nukance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1004 (1966). See also RE~FATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS.
§ 821A cmt. c (1979) ("as used in the Restatement, 'nuisance' does not signify any particular kind of conduct on the part of the defendant").
73. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2902 n.18 (1992).
74. Id at 2901: "The 'total taking' inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail (as the
application of state nuisance law ordinarily entails) analysis of, among other things, the
degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed by the
claimant's activities,
the social value of the claimant's proposed activities and their
suitability to the locality in question, . . . and the relative ease with which the alleged harm
can be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent
landowners) alike . . .." (citations omitted).

. . . ."

...

Heinonline - - 18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 13 1993

any common-law prohibition."75 One is the "fact that a particular
use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners." The
other is the "fact that other landowners, similarly situated, are
permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant."76
Whether state courts will actually be required to give major
weight to these two additional "facts" (where present) is unclear.
If, as the Court insisted, "the question . . . is one of state law,"77
then it should be up to state courts to decide how much weight, if
any, such factors should have.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court, in its effort to define nuisance with paraphrases from the Second Restatement of Torts
plus these two additional factors, did not necessarily exhaust the
relevant "background principles" of nuisance, especially of public
nuisance. The cited Restatement provision^,^^ for example, reflect
the Restatement's private tort orientation and, accordingly, stress a
"balance of utilities" approach that bases determinations of nuisance on whether "the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of
the actor's conduct."79 It is, however, highly debatable whether
any such private-tort balancing of utilities is proper in the public
nuisance context.80 The reason is that public nuisance enforcement is essentially an exercise of the state's police power, and the
public welfare it aims to protect is not just another interest in a
mix with competing private concerns.S1 In the post-Lucas period,
therefore, the most important "background principle" of nuisance law may be the one that the Supreme Court adopted when,
long before Lucas, it rejected any simple "balancing of utilities"
for public nuisance cases brought by a state:
This court has not quite the same freedom to balance the harm
that will be done by an injunction against that of which the
plaintiff complains, that it would have in deciding between two
subjects of a single political power. Without excluding the con75. Lutac, 112 S. Ct. at 2901 (emphasis added).
76. Id
77. Id (emphasis added).
78. See supra note 74.
OF TORTS,5 826(a) (1979).
79. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
80. For a fine discussion of this and other confusions between public and private nuisance law, see Robert Abrams &Val Washington, The Misunhtood Law offiblic Nuisance: A
Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer. 54 ALB. L. REV. 358, 377-78
passim (1990).
81. Id. at 378. As the Court wrote in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,
237-38 (1907): "The states, by entering the Union, did not sink to the position of private
owners, subject to one system of private law."
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siderations that equity always takes into account, we cannot
give the weight that was given them in argument to a comparison between the damage threatened to the plaintiff and the calamity of a possible stop to the defendants' business . . . .s2

Like the balancing test, the two additional "facts" cited in Lucas
as "ordinarily" indicative of nuisance also appear to be incomplete expressions of the background principles that they represent. The idea, for example, that state courts must allow people
to undertake particular activities just because they have "long
been engaged in" by others is inconsistent with the tradition of
nuisance law as a flexible body of legal responses. Indeed, the
Supreme Court itself contradicted such a notion when it observed
that "changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what
was previously permissible no longer s0."83
Similarly, the significance of the fact that "other landowners . . .
are permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant" is
greatly tempered by equity's longstanding concern with relative
hardships4 - a concern that often suggests that existing uses
should, in fairness, be treated less strictly than uses that are
merely proposed.85 Destroying an investment in an existing land
use that has since been deemed "undesirable" typically works a
far greater burden on the affected owners than merely prohibiting
the establishment of new detrimental land uses. A landowner
who is forbidden to commence a new use and a landowner who is
not permitted to continue an existing use are never really quite
"similarly situated."
The key word in all of this is "ordinarily"
that the treatment
of "similarly situated owners ordinan'ly imports a lack of any common-law prohibition."86 When ongoing activities are permitted
to continue, it is ordinarily a fair and natural presumption that the
activities produce no undue harm (if, indeed, they produce any
harm at all). Or, in a somewhat different vein, one may ordinarily

-

82. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 239 (granting injunction against a
polluting factory whose sulphurous fumes caused and threatened damage to "forests and
vegetable life, if not to health, within the plaintiff state").
83. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
3 827 cmt. g (1979)).
84. See HENRYL. ~~CCLINTOCK,
EQUITY$ 5 144-45 (2d ed. 1948).
85. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
3 941 (1979). CJ, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870,872 (N.Y. 1970) (refusing to enjoin a polluting activity on the
grounds that, although the $45,000,000 factory had caused substantial damage, there was
a "large disparity in the economic consequences of the nuisance and of the injunction").
86. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992) (emphasis
added).
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presume that merely stopping one actor while letting others continue serves no purpose because the harm supposedly being addressed would end up occurring anyway.87
Any such natural presumptions about the "ordinary" case are,
however, equally naturally rebuttable. When, for example, the
observed results of land-use activities are themselves the cause
for alarm (as, for example, in the cases of filling of wetlands, destruction of habitat, and pollution of reservoirs), the fact that the
particular activities were lawful in the past does not, in itself, become a permanent justification for their continuation. On the
contrary, the fact that observed consequences of particular landuse activities impelled the legislature to move against them is a
sign that non-"ordinary" circumstances are present. It is, after
all, still a comparatively rare event for legislatures to ban previously lawful uses of land.S8
Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court will let "background principles of state property and nuisance"s9 law freely
evolve in their new constitutional role, or whether their evolution
will be hemmed and hobbled by federally-enforced "objectively
reasonable application of relevant precedents."gO The latter alternative, which is possible if state law developments seem too
liberal, would amount to the creation of a supervening federal law
of akmnum absque injuria to protect private owners' rights to engage in harm-producing uses of land.
87. Two situations must be carefully distinguished. One is the case mentioned in the
text, in which particular land-use activities that could be viewed as deleterious in another
context are permitted because the goals of a prohibition cannot (or can no longer) be
accomplished. For example, it would be pointless to prohibit a Manhattan construction
project in order to preserve a potential habitat for large mammalian species that disappeared from the city long ago.
This is, however, very different from a case in which a prospective polluter claims a
freedom from use regulations on the ground that her discrete addition to the existing load
would be too negligible to matter. Such "deaths of a thousand cuts" are the classic way
that environmental resources degrade or vanish, and there may be no logical place to draw
the line except at the point to which things have progressed when the need for a response
is perceived. The legislature may not wish (or be able) to undo the "cuts" that have already occurred, but it should not for that reason forfeit its ability to prevent further resource degradation.
88. New enactments of local zoning laws and the downzoning of areas to less intensive
uses probably represent the most frequent instances of legislatures banning previously
lawful land uses. For any given piece of land, however, the imposition of a new zoning law
usually happens only once, and~subsequentdownzonings of the land - though they can
occur - are relatively rare occurrences.
89. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
90. Id. at 2902 n.18 (emphasis omitted).
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C. Statutory Nuisances: Redefining The "Rights to Harm 0 t h ~ "
As knowledge, needs, and social values evolve with time and
changed circumstances, what once seemed innocuous may grow
noxious, while the noxious may become benign. A century ago,
for example, beer and margarine were considered harmful
enough substances to justify a legal ban, while opiates were sold
without prescription and Coca-Cola contained cocaine.g1 The
valued wetlands of today were the noisome swamps and bogs of
yesteryear. Beaches and riverbanks, once thought the perfect
place for a house, are now viewed in hindsight, after disastrous
floods, in a very different way. As conditions change with the
times, so do the thresholds of socially intolerable conduct, including uses of land.
For hundreds of years, both legislatures and the courts have
had the power to declare new kinds of nuisances as new needs
became evident.92 Indeed, for public nuisance - an indictable
offense93 - it has been long regarded as a classically legislative
function to determine "what the interests of the public require"
and "what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests."94 Most of the historic range of public nuisance, like
other common law crimes, is now encompassed in various statutory offenses.95 In fact, the common law crime of public nuisance,
rather than the tort of private nuisance, is more naturally regarded as the pre-statutory ancestor of most land-use regulations
today - especially those whose violation is indictable and enjoin91. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (margarine); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623 (1887) (beer); United States v. Housley, 751 F. Supp. 1446. 1447 (D. Nev. 1990)
DUSTER,
THE
(noting that Coca-Cola "once contained a small amount of cocaine"); TROY
L E G ~ ~ LOFA~ ~~O~R ANL I T Y3-15 (1970) (discussing the prevalence and effects of over-thecounter sales of narcotics until such sales were prohibited in 1914); RONALD
HAMOIW,
DEALING
WITH DRUGS:CONSEQUENCES
OF GOVERNMENT
CONTROL
9-12 (1987).
92. SeegenerallyJ.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance -A Critical Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE
LJ.
55 (1989).
93. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
3 821B cmts. a, d (1979).
94. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894). See afso Mugler, 123 U.S. at 660-61
("Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere . . . .Under
our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the government.").
95. For example, public nuisances affecting public health (such as maintaining "foul and
unhealthy" swampy land or polluting public water supplies) are encompassed in public
health regulations. See, e.g., CONN.GEN.STAT. ANN.3 25-43 (West 1990), CONN.GEN.
STAT.ANN.3 19a-212 (West 1986). Public nuisances affecting public comfort, such as operating noisome businesses near highways, might be dealt with as health offenses (e.g.,
N.Y. PUB.HEALTH
LAIV 3 1300-a (McKinney 1990)) or through segregation of incompatible uses under zoning regulations.
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able by the state.g6 The courts long ago relinquished their original dominant role in defining public nuisances; as society's
malefactors discovered ever new kinds of mischief to plague the
rest of us, it generally has fallen to legislatures to keep the law of
nuisance up to
Even before the modern criminal law codifications, legislatures
have traditionally had authority to add new kinds of public mischief to the list of public nuisances.98 One of the first legislated
public nuisances was an Elizabethan regulation forbidding cottages to be built on rural lots of fewer than four acres freehold.99
Violations of the London building code of 1666 are another example of early public nuisances.100
Following the American Revolution, state legislatures assumed
the role in the United States that Parliament had played in England as the principal legislators in the public nuisance field.
Though today the legislature usually declares public harms to be
illegal without actually denominating them as "public nuisances,"
the principle is the same. As for the constitutional validity of legislated additions to the public nuisance list, the Supreme Court
held, when the question first arose a century ago, that "all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the
owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community."101
The Court later added that it is "clearly within the police power
of the State . . . 'to declare that in particular circumstances and in
particular localities a [use affecting the "health and comfort of the
community"] shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and in law.' "lo2
The Court recognized, in short, that legislatures must be able
to withdraw prior existing rights to harm others and to reset the
thresholds of "nuisance" as new conditions arise. To hold other96. For example, a violation of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act is a misdemeanor
ACT 5 8 (U.S.
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. STANDARD
ZONING
ENABLING
Dept of Commerce, rev. ed. 1926), reprinted in DANIELR. MANDELKER
& ROGERA. CUNNINGHAM, PUNNING
AND CONTROL
OF LAND DEVELOPMENT
168-72 (3d ed. 1990).
97. In fact, it has been said that "to the extent that public nuisance is still a crime, it is
codified by statute and does not exist in the common law." Abrams & Washington, supra
note 80, at 365.
98. See generally Spencer, supra note 92.
99. See BLACKSTONE,
supra note 67. at *168.
100. Act for Rebuilding the City of London, 1666, 19 Car. 2, ch. 3, I11 (Eng.), reprinted in
8 DANBY
PICKERING,
STATUTES
AT LARGE 233,234 (Cambridge University, London, 1763).
101. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887).
102. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394. 41 1 (1915) (quoting Reinman v. City of
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915)) (emphasis added).
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wise would deny state legislatures vital authority to respond to
change. Accordingly, even though property ownership must, as a
practical matter, involve incidental rights to cause external harms,
such rights to harm others have long been subject to legislative
redefinition.103
In its 1922 landmark opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,104 however, the Court introduced a now oft-quoted caveat: "[Wlhile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."l05
Although the Court did not say in Mahon exactly how far is "too
far," it held that the Pennsylvania legislature had overstepped the
line by enacting a law forbidding people from removing coal from
under other people's houses.106 In striking down Pennsylvania's
law, the Court affirmed that there are, to quote Lucas, "limits to
the noncompensable exercise of the police power."107
Loath to "nullify" this "affirmation of limits,"lOs the Court in
Lucas chose instead to solidify and entrench Mahon's truncation of
elected legislatures' centuries-old authority. As support for such
a distribution of institutional power the Court cited a "historic
compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of
our constitutional culture"10g (as distinguished, apparently, from
the Takings Clause that the Framers intended to make part of the
Constitution itsel£)."O In limiting the legislature's power the
103. See supra text accompanying note 94.
104. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
105. Id at 415.
106. Because earlier conveyances had severed the surface rights from the mineral
rights, the coal and the houses had different owners, and the Pennsylvania law in question
rendered the mineral rights valueless. However, it was necessary for the coal to remain in
the ground to prevent the houses on the surface from sinking into subsidence craters.
107. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886. 2899 (1992).
108. Id at 2899, 2900 n.15.
109. Id at 2900. The Court also cited a series of cases beginning in 1980 that have
repeated the dictum that a compensable taking occurs when a land-use regulation "denies
an owner economically viable use of his land." Id. at 2893 (quoting Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) and subsequent cases reiterating the Agins quotation).
Based upon this oft-repeated Agim dictum, the Court insisted that it did not "invent" the
Lucar rule for total takings. Id at 2893 n.6.
Regardless of the genesis of the rule, Luras appears to be the first case actually to hold
that a particular land use restriction violated the Agim "economically viable use" criterion.
Before Lucus thus elevated dictum to holding, the question was open whether the Takings
Clause really gives owners a minimum, inviolable economic guarantee.
110. As far as the historical evidence reveals, the Takings Clause was not originally intended to apply to mere restrictions on use. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Note. The
Origins and Original Signyicance of the Just Compensation Clause of the F$h Amendment, 94 YALE
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Court made it a certainty that at least some private rights to harm
others will now be constitutionally inviolable. 1
Even with its theoretically narrow application to "relatively rare
situations,""2 the Lucas-Mahon truncation of legislative authority
may have some wider implications. For instance, it is possible
that Lucas is only the beginning of a trend towards greater protection of property owners from public interest legislation.l13 An
LJ. 694, 71 1 (1985). Certainly no such intention was reflected in the legal institutions of
our country's formative years. See Scott M. Reznick, Note, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in 19th Century America, 40 U. CHI.L. REV.854 (1973). As late as 1897, the
Supreme Court still firmly believed, based on an "immense weight of authority," that taking required a "physical invasion of the real estate." Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S.
269,275-76 (1897) ("[Alcts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not
directly encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its use,
are universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision."
(emphasis added) (quoting Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635,642 (1878))). The
true origin of the regulatory takings law isJustice Holmes's bold and brilliantjudicial activism in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), see supra text accompanying
notes 104-06.
The majority opinion in Lucar conceded that it "is correct that early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all . .
Lucar, 112 S . Ct. at 2900 n.15. However, it dismissed these earlier understandings as "entirely irrelevant" in light of Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)
(extending the application of the Takings Clause to the states) and Pennsylvania Coal, 260
U.S. 393 (first recognizing the regulatory taking concept). These two cases seem to be the
location of the majority's "historic compact," assuming it is located anywhere at all.
111. Except, of course, if the public is willing to pay the harmdoer to refrain from committing the harm.
112. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
113. "This issue 'is the new frontier in property law,' " according to Scott Bullock, an
attorney for the Institute ofJustice, which filed an amicus brief in Lucar urging an expansion
of property owners' rights under the takings clause. Yang with Hong, supra note 27, at 31.
Yang and Hong also reported that "property-rights activists plan to test how far the court
is willing to carry its logic." Id.
A recent announcement by the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy refers to the
"growing number of owners who have organized under various banners, including the
controversial Wise Use movement. Employing a strategy of selective litigation combined
with grass roots lobbyingand public relations campaigns, Wise Use activists and others are
seeking compensation when government restrains the use of their land. The Lucas decision signals that these efforts are paying off." Mark Pollot Availabk for Interview and CommenJune 29, 1992, availabk in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR Newswire File.
tary, PR NEIVSWIRE,
As of early 1992, almost 200 takings claims were pending in the United State Claims
Court, including challenges to the government's authority to "clean up toxic wastes, regulate grazing and water rights, buy land for national parks, restrict mining in wild areas and
set aside private land to protect wetlands." Keith Schneider, Environment Laws Face a Stlf
Test from Landowners, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 1992, at Al. The results of some recent cases
brought in that court have, arguably, been more favorable to landowners than can be justified by a reading of past Supreme Court decisions on segmentation (see infra text accompanying notes 117-20). See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 C1. Ct. 161 (1990)
(wetland protection); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 C1. Ct. 153 (1990) (wet-

. ."
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obvious way to extend the Lucas holding would be simply to relax
the requirement of "total taking." A rule giving compensation
for less-than-100% value reductions would, however, present difficult issues of line drawing (and, in the process, become a fertile
source of litigation). Anyway, the Lucas majority seemed unconcerned that singling out "total takings" gives a weird talismanic
significance to the last few percentage points of value affected by
a regulation. As it noted (with a less-than-keen sense of equity):
"Takings law is full of these 'all-or-nothing' situations."ll*
A more conservative approach to extending Lucas might involve
increasing the number of situations that are deemed to fall within
the "total takings" zone. There is nothing self-evident about
when a use restriction takes "all economically beneficial use.""5
For example, can a use that provides only below-market rates of
return still be considered "economically beneficial"? Most business people would probably say no. On the other hand, the "economically beneficial" concept cannot be logically tied to rates of
return without making the whole analysis circular, since rates of
return depend on market values, while market values depend on
rates of return. A further problem is that, if owners are constitutionally guaranteed some minimum "rate" of return, private market transactions will ratchet up constitutionally assured minimum
uses of land.116
Another approach to increasing the number of situations that
fall in the "total takings" zone, and one in which the Lucas majority showed some interest, is to eliminate or cut back on the "nosegmentation" rule, which provides:
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking,
this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action
land protection); see also Whitney Benefits. Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (strip mining in alluvial valley floor).
See also Charles P. Alexander, Gunning For the Greens, TIME,
Feb. 3, 1992, at 70; H. Jane
Lehman, Landowners Go lo Court lo Fight for Properly Rights, WASH.
Pos~.Jan. 4, 1992, at El;
David Kaplan & Bob Cohn, Pay Me or Get OffMy Land. NEWSWEEK,March 9, 1992. at 70.
114. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
115. "Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible
use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property
interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured." Lucac, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
116. See my earlier discussion of this subject in John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land
Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339, 360-65 (1989).
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and on the nature of the interference with rights in thparcel as a
whole . . . .117

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this rule, especially after Lucas. It is largely because of no-segmentation that
total regulatory takings are, as the Court observed, "relatively
rare."l18 Many millions of acres of America's important natural
resource lands - wetlands, coastlands, reservoir watersheds,
stream corridors, endangered species habitats - have little commercial value in their natural condition. These same lands, however, have great market value potential if their natural features
can be degraded or destroyed by development. After Lucas, regulatory protection of these vulnerable portions of our national
landbase depends on their being joined in larger parcels that have
substantial value "as a whole."
Although the no-segmentation rule has been a constitutional
fixture for nearly as long as the Mahon truncation that it qualifies,
the Court's opinion in Lucas exhibits a marked lack of enthusiasm
for the rule.119 Despite the rule's explicitness, the majority found
its application to be "unclear7':
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave
90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we
would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been
deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened
portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a
mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.120

The opinion also dismissed the several post-Mahon cases applying
the rule as "inconsistent pronouncements" by the Court.121 It
seems a fair surmise that some of the Justices, at least, have serious doubts about the rule itself. An "Imperial Judiciary" would
have no difficulty extending Lucas by contracting "no-segmentation," but institutional considerations counsel against doing
so.
117. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,497 (1987) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)).
118. See supra text accompanying note 112.
119. Chief Justice Rehnquist's earlier opinions have evinced a similar skepticism about
the no-segmentation rule. See, e.g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 515-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 142-43, 149 n.13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
120. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2894 n.7 (1992) (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. On its first day in session after rendering the Luras decision, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in a case that would have raised the "no-segmentation" rule directly.
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IV.

SUPERVISION
AND THE REVISION
OF LEGISLATIVE
JUDGMENTS

JUDICIAL

It is, as stated earlier, a perennial question of legal policy to
determine which interference-producing uses of land should be
tolerated and which, on balance, ought to be banned. There is a
separate and essentially constitutional question: Which part of the
government should be doing the balancing and making the substantive decisions about land-use rights and wrongs?
Our nation's constitutional tradition is clear: "Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere . . . .
Under our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch
of the government."123 "[Alnd in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only
what the interests of the public require, but what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests."124 Nevertheless, a
legislature's own "determination as to what is a proper exercise
of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
The proper scope for this judicial
supervision of the
supervision of legislatures is the crux of the "regulatory takings"
issue.
In recent years, regulatory takings review has sometimes been
treated as an occasion forjudges to rethink, ad hoc, the purposes
and means that the legislature has selected - turning the question of legislative authority into a rebalancing of the relevant interests to see if the legislature's land-use regulation was a sound
policy choice.lZ6 For the most part, since the repudiation of the
Tull v. Virginia, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992). The state had denied the owner of a 43-acre site a
permit to fill the approximately two acres of wetlands on the site. Tull v. Virginia (Cir. Ct.
Accomack County Va. Nov. 4, 1991), petitionfor cert.filed 61 U.S.L.W. 3160 (U.S. Sept. 8,
1992) (No. 92-112) ("Question presented: Does Fifth Amendment allow denial of just
compensation by including non-regulated upland property into 'relevant calculus,' when
just compensation would be required if 'parcel as a whole' were limited to regulated wetlands and permit denial prohibited all economic viable use of wetland property that must
remain forever in its natural state?').
123. hfugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887).
124. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
125. Id at 137.
126. The "determination that governmental action constitutes a taking, is, in essence, a
determination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of
an exercise of state power in the public interest," a question that "necessarily requires a
weighing of private and public interests." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
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Lochner line of cases in the late 1 9 3 0 ' the
~ ~ Supreme
~ ~ ~ Court's
decisions have not supported suchjudicial second-guessing in the
economic sphere.128 Beyond assuring that legislative purposes
fall within a "broad range" of legitimacy129 and that the means
selected are rational,l30 the courts have been largely deferential
in a regulatory takings review.
By making the common law of nuisance a criterion for legislative validity, however, the Supreme Court has read the Takings
Clause as a warrant for courts to substitute their own substantive
judgments about land-use rights and wrongs in place of those of
the legislature. At least in cases of "total takings," Lucas directs
the courts to establish limits on the legislature's authority by reweighing the very same sorts of factors that the legislature itself
should have considered when deciding whether to enact the challenged law. In applying the common-law nuisance criterion, the
question for the courts is not whether the legislature proceeded
in a rational way towards a proper objective. It is whether the
legislature reached the right conclusion.
In evaluating this assignment of ultimate land-use authority to
the courts, it is not enough to observe that the legislative process
can sometimes result in unjust burdens to private owners. While
legislatures cannot always be relied on to provide perfectly "just"
results, neither can courts -a choice between an imperfect dem480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon. 447 U.S.
255. 261 (1980)).
For an example of explicit judicial replication of the legislative weighing process, see
Florida Rock Indus. v. United States. 21 C1. Ct. 161, 166-68 (1990).
127. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a labor standards law on
substantive due process grounds). By 1938, the Court had made it clear that due process
protections were, at least in regard to economic legislation, not a basis for courts to second-guess the wisdom of legislativejudgments. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[Rlegulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions
is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless .it is of such a character as to preclude
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis ..."). See also, e.g., Pennell v. City of
San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (upholding rent control); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587
(1987) (stating that legislative acts must be reviewed under a "rational basis" standard);
Day-Bright Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,423 (1952) ("We do not sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation . . . .").
128. See supra text accompanying notes 41, 45-54.
129. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987).
130. Judicial "inquiry into legislative purpose is not intended as a license to judge the
effectiveness of legislation," the sole constitutional question on review being whether the
"Legislature rationally could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective." Kqstone, 480 U.S. at 511 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984)).

..

.

Heinonline - - 18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 24 1993

Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance

19931

25

ocratic process and an imperfect non-democratic one. The question is this: As social norms, knowledge, and context shift over
time, which institution is better suited to weigh and reweigh the
many competing interests, public and private, and keep the laws
attuned to the times?
There are good reasons why the final authority to fix and revise
the optimal balance in the land-use field has historically been left
to legislators. Legislatures are set up to address complex issues
comprehensively, to deal with diverse interrelated issues
programmatically, and to codify rather than merely to decide controversies case by case.13' Unlike judges, moreover, legislators
face frequent re-elections and constant constituent contact. But
most importantly, access to legislators is a legitimate right of everyone who cares about the policy choices being made. Courts, by
contrast, are purposely insulated from such a diversity of views.
No matter how widespread the potential impact of a pending
case, only the parties to the litigation have the right to address the
judge, or provide perspective on the issues.
In short, legislatures are generally far better positioned than
the judicial branch to exercise that "large discretion . . . to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what
131. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.. 257 N.E.2d 870,871 (N.Y. 1970) (declining to
enjoin an air pollution source on the ground (among others) that courts should not try,
"as a by-product of private litigation. .. to lay down and implement an effective policy for
the elimination of air pollution," explaining that "the judicial establishment is neither
equipped
nor prepared" to do so).
In their review of "judicial zoning" referred to earlier. Beuscher and Momson noted
that judge-made criteria for resolving land use conflicts "show the extreme difficulty of
choosing, through the individualized process of case law, between clashing land uses that
exist in bewildering variety." Beuscher & Momson, supra note 34, at 442-43. While common law nuisance criteria can work fairly effectively in areas that have already acquired a
homogeneous developed character, courts "hesitate to forecast the land use future" of
mixed use districts and "are apt to stand aside and let topsy-like growth run its course."
Id. at 447. Thus, it is seldom possible to obtain an advance injunction prohibiting the
establishment of a specific use threatening to be a nuisance because, as one court put it, if
the use were " 'restrained in the first instance, we could never learn from the great teacher
experience, whether [it] would, in fact, be a nuisance or not.' " Oechsle v. Ruhl, 54 A.2d
462,467 (N.J. 1947) (quoting Duncan v. Hayes &Greenwood, 22 N.J.Eq. 25,28 (1871)).
Another consequence of the courts' case-by-case approach is that it leaves the common
law of nuisance almost powerless to deal with subtle, long-range cumulative deleterious
impacts. For example, the extension of suburban sprawl into a public reservoir watershed
can ultimately destroy the reservoir's water quality, but each individual new house contributes so imperceptibly to the problem that it does not seem to be a "nuisance" in itself. Cf:
s u p not; 87 (discussing the legislature's ability to address subtle, long-term resource
degradation).

...
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measures are necessary for the protection of such interests."ls2
This is especially so in the economic sphere, where "the fact is
that virtually all economic regulation benefits some segments of
the society and harms others."l33
The "reality [is] that determination of 'the public interest' in
the manifold areas of government regulation entails not merely
economic and mathematical analysis but value judgment . . . ."134
If legislative decisions to regulate objectionable land uses are
"made subject to wcpost facto judicial assessment of 'the public interest,' with personal liability of city officials a possible consequence, [the Supreme Court] will have gone far to compromise
the States' ability to regulate their domestic commerce"135 and,
one might add, to protect the viability of their domestic landbase.
A reviewing court may or may not agree that a particular legislative land-use restriction is justified by the potentially deleterious
external impacts that it averts, or that the economic impact on
private owners is justified. The question is how far the Takings
Clause should be diverted from its historic purposels6 and read as
a license for courts to substitute their de novo determinations on
these points for those of the legislatures elected by the people.ls7
132. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133. 136 (1894).
133. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 111 S. Ct. 1344, 1352 (1991)
(Scalia, J.),
Occasionally, of course,judicial review of legislative acts may provide appropriate occasions for substantive decision-making. Review of legislation that appears to impinge upon
"fundamental rights," a situation in which the democratic processes may be especially distrusted, is an example of such an occasion.
The subject of "fundamental rights" is far outside the scope of this article, but it is
noted in passing that rights to make particular uses of property do not at all fit the mold of
"fundamental rights." A typical characteristic of a fundamental right (such as free expression and voting) is that everyone can enjoy the full exercise of the right without interfering
appreciably with the full and equal exercise of the right by everyone else. Property rights
do not possess this characteristic: each person's use of property all too frequently conflicts
and interferes, to some extent, with other people's uses of their property. If X is accorded
a "fundamental" right to use his property as a family residence, then next-door neighbor Y
plainly cannot have a "fundamental" right to use her property as a steel mill, or vice versa.
A related point is that "fundamental rights" are distributed equally (or they ought to
be). Property rights, by contrast, are not distributed equally, making it doubtful that they
are (or ought to be) the subject of a "fundamental" constitutional guarantee.
134. Omni Outdoor, 111 S. Ct. at 1352.
135. Id (citing Southern Motor Camers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48 (1985)).
136. As noted earlier, the available historical evidence indicates that the Takings Clause
was not intended to apply to use restrictions at all. See supra note 110.
137. In adumbrating a far more fitting role for the courts in regulatory takings cases,
Professor Farber recently described the Takings Clause as "a method of universalizing the
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The regulatory takings debate is not really about property
rights, their sanctity, or the appropriateness of governmental limits on their exercise. It is not, in its essence, a debate about private owner sovereignty as opposed to governmental sovereignty
over the land of the United States.138 It is, more fundamentally,
an institutional debate as to which branch of government should
have the final say on the substantive issues of land-use regulation.
For a "relatively rare" group of cases, at least, the Supreme Court
has resolved that question in favor of the judiciary by elevating
the common law of nuisance to a position of unprecedented constitutional importance.
The holding of Lucas is narrow, and its substantive effects will
be easy enough for legislatures to avoid. By creating procedures
for "hardship variances" for owners who can prove total takings,
governmental entities should be able to avoid liability even for
"temporary regulatory takings."ls9 The integrity of programs to
protect low market-value natural resource lands can be largely
maintained as well. By judicious use of "subdivision regulations"
to prevent sensitive lands from being severed from their buildable neighbors, parcels that contain sensitive lands can retain
their "economically beneficial use" viewed "as a whole," precludusual practice of government compensation for certain losses." Daniel A. Farber, Public
Choice andJust Compensation. 9 CONST.COMMENTARY
279,303 (1992). His conception of the
just-compensation requirement as essentially a "trade usage" law is potent, both as a matter of explanation and legal prescription. Id. at 298-99. Recognizing that elected legislatures are normally motivated to provide compensation in a variety of circumstances, he
argues that the key role of the constitutional requirement is to "make the compensation
practice uniform" to prevent the stochastic injustice of occasional compensation denials
in circumstances where compensation usually is granted. Id at 299. Thus, instead of mediating the great social debates about the ideal roles of private property and community
self-protection programs, courts would leave such questions to elected legislatures, confining themselves to ensuring that the legislative balancing process
whatever it is - is
fairly and consistently applied.
Indeed, Professor Farber's argument could be taken even further, assimilating takings
jurisprudence to the law of private property generally. Are not all laws protecting private
property (such as laws prohibiting trespass and burglary) essentially like trade usage law.
enforcing against occasional opportunistic disregard of the deference that most people
give to other people's possession anyway?
138. These are very important matters, of course, but they are not at the essence of the
regulatory takings debate.
139. The Court has held that a use restriction that eliminates "all use" of ~rivateland
entitles the owner to compensation for the resultant "temporary taking" even if the government later repeals the offending law. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los
Angeles, 482 U.S.304 (1987). The Court emphasized, however, that its holding did not
apply to "normal delays in obtaining. variances, and the like." Id at 321.

-

-
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ing the need for excessive use of variances.140 Perhaps the easiest
way to inoculate land-use laws against Lucas will be to create limited systems of transferable development rights so that no property in land could ever be considered entirely without
economically beneficial use.141
Narrow and easily avoidable or not, however, even a partial reduction of traditional legislative authority is cause for concern.
Each time it happens, as the Lucas author stated in another case,
"the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that
extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of
that eminent tribunal."l4* And as the Supreme Court itself cautioned at another time, "one branch of the government cannot
encroach on the domain of another without danger. The safety of
our institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance
of this salutary rule."l43

Societal regulation of intolerable behavior, in connection with
land use and otherwise, cannot be a fixed set of rules, but must
evolve with the times. Legislative additions to the common law of
nuisance have been a primary mechanism for keeping land-use
law up to date. In apparent response to sentiment for reining in
legislatures' broad traditional discretion, however, the Supreme
Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council erected a new "categorical" rule of takings for the "relatively rare situations" of "total takings" of "all economically beneficial use."
The Lucas case was presented as a takings case, but the
Supreme Court declined to decide whether the land-use regula140. Of course, this strategy of keeping sensitive lands united in ownership with adjacent reasonably buildable lands will only work to the extent that the no-segmentation rule
remains in place. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
As noted earlier, since Luras, the Court has already denied certiorari in a case that would
have raised the "no-segmentation" rule directly. See supra note 122.
141. I have, in another article, discussed the possible constitutional infirmity of transferable development rights systems where the connection between the sending and receiving
parcels is not sufficiently close. Humbach, supra note 116, at 352 n.39.
142. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2883 (1992)
(Scalia,J., dissenting) (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861),
reprinted in Inaugural Addresses of the Presihts of the United States, S. Doc. No. 10, lOlst Cong.,
1st Sess. 139 (1989)).
143. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888). Accord Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (stating that the judiciary must avoid "taking to itself authority to
govern the country without express constitutional authority").
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tion at issue was a taking. Instead, it created an enclave of legislative impotence in a field where the policy choices of the people's
elected representatives had previously reigned supreme. Uses of
land inevitably come into conflict with one another and with other
important values, and hard choices inevitably must be made. The
Lucas truncation of legislatures' powers to make these choices is,
at the least, a questionable reassignment of institutional
authority.
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